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Summary
This paper reviews the Funds Trade Restrictiveness Index (IMF-TRI). It has
three parts.
The rst part describes what the IMF-TRI is and the data needed to compute
it. This part also traces the history of usage and the debate on the use of the
IMF-TRI within the fund. It draws on internal Fund documentation as well as
interviews conducted by Ms. Tan at IEO and the consultant. It also includes
a discussion of the key documents produced internally and commissioned from
external sources by the Fund.
The second part asks what a good measure should be. There is no one size
ts all measure as trade restrictiveness is multi dimensional. However, there is no
reason to rely on a single measure of trade restrictiveness to capture all these di-
mensions. Depending on how comprehensive a measure is needed, one or a variety
of measures may be deemed appropriate to look at. The strengths and weaknesses
of the IMF-TRI are highlighted and existing measures briey surveyed.
The third part suggests that an approach based on work by James Anderson,
Peter Neary, and Robert Feenstra (ANF-TRI), together with other indicators, be
used by the IMF in the future. The approach is relatively exible and can be
used to construct a basic measure of trade restrictiveness or a variety of more
comprehensive ones as described in this section.
This approach has been implemented by a group of economists at or formerly
at the World Bank(H.L. Kee, M. Olarrelanga, A. Nicata). The relevant indices
are available online. The averages of some of these indices are being reported in
the Global Monitoring Report (GMR) which is put out under the joint auspices
of the Bank, Fund, WTO and UNCTAD, and has presumably been vetted by
all of the above. This provides additional legitimacy for the Funds use of the
index. Moreover, the Bank is committed to updating these indices annually for
the GMR.
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1. Introduction
There have been many measures of trade restrictiveness proposed in the literature.
The IMF uses one such measure in its policy work. This paper will serve as a
background paper on the IMFs Trade Restrictiveness Index (IMF-TRI) and the
case for and feasibility of the TRI or alternative frameworks for guiding the IMFs
advice in its work on trade.
1.1. The IMF-TRI
The IMF-TRI is a 10-point-scale overall trade restrictiveness index (10 = most
restrictive, 1 =most open) used by the IMF. It was created in 1997 for use with the
Board paper, Trade Liberalization in Fund-Supported Programs(EBS/97/163),
to evaluate trade reform within 27 program countries from 1990-1997. The base
TRI was 1990 and its evolution until 1997 was thus tracked. Subsequently, it has
continued to be calculated annually for 178 IMF member countries (latest being
2007 gures). Overall, the development of this index was viewed positively as
it was seen as a valuable tool for classifying the relative restrictiveness of trade
regimes. However, even in 1997, its limitations were noted and some Directors
cautioned against placing undue emphasis on it. However, others felt that it should
be used as an input in designing and monitoring trade liberalization components
ongoing fund supported programs.
The IMF-TRI originated, in the rst place, from an older IMF index created by
Kirmani et al (1994a, b) that studied trade reforms in IMF-supported programs.
Kirmanis index was a 3-category index (Open, Moderate, Restrictive) as opposed
to a 10-point index like the IMF-TRI. The IMF-TRI sub-divided tari¤regimes into
5 categories instead of 3, and also incorporated tari¤dispersion or exemptions into
the classication. The IMF-TRI also sought to additionally link changes in overall
restrictiveness to the policy content of the Fund-supported programs (SM/94/192,
Supplement 2).
1.1.1. Construction of the IMF-TRI
The computation of the 10-point IMF-TRI (10 = most restrictive, 1 = least re-
strictive) is via the following formula:
TRI = 1 + (t  1) + 3(N   1);
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where t is the Tari¤ Index and takes integral values from f1; 2; : : : ; 5g;depending
on the level of a simple unweighted average of MFN applied tari¤ rates for that
country, plus any additional surcharges/fees applied only to imports. Average
tari¤s below 10 were assigned a value of 1, average tari¤s of 10 to 15% were
assigned a value of 2, while those between 15 to 20% were assigned a 3, and those
between 20 and 25% were assigned a 4. Average tari¤s above 25% were assigned a
5.) N is the NTB Index which takes integral values from f1; 2; 3g depending on the
extent of NTBs. A countrys use of non tari¤ barriers such as quotas, restrictive
licensing requirements, bans, state trading or exchange restrictions is considered
in this classication, with a value of value of 2 being assigned if the coverage of
NTBs in trade or production is between 1% and 25%. The resultant combination
of tari¤s and NTB into a single measure via the aforementioned formula yields the
ten point classication scheme. (See Annex 1 of Trade Liberalization in Fund
Supported ProgramsEBS/97/163.) Note that the dispersion of tari¤s does not
play any role in this index. This is unfortunate as greater dispersion increases the
adverse impact of trade policy on welfare. Small tari¤s have very small adverse
e¤ects when the equilibrium is close to rst best as the welfare function has its
peak at the rst best tari¤ so is relatively at in this neighborhood, while larger
tari¤s result in disproportionately larger welfare losses.
1.2. History of the Usage of the IMF-TRI
From 2 Apr. 1998, Management authorized its use in sta¤reports on newmedium-
term ( 2 year) adjustment programs (Memo from Jack Boorman to Heads of
Area Departments, April 2, 1998). It was meant to be used for the purposes
of evaluation of a countrys trade restrictiveness over time. However, IMF sta¤
had begun using it regularly for surveillance, and it thus also appeared regularly
in Article IV Sta¤ Reports and Selected Issues Papers. The TRI was not to be
published in public documents to avoid confusion by external parties.
In 2003, the Trade Policy Division in the IMF conducted a review of the TRI.
William Cline was hired to produce a review of the IMFs TRI. The review was
to outline the state of knowledge, highlighting the methodology and its pros and
cons, as well as providing at least two alternatives that were operationally viable.
The paper was completed in 2003 and was entitled Enhancing the IMFs Index of
Trade Restrictiveness. It contains a number of important observations. First, it
points out that the TRI does not capture tari¤s in agriculture e¤ectively. It points
out that tari¤ rate quotas (with over quota tari¤s being quite high) replaced phys-
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ical quotas as a consequence of Uruguay Round negotiations. These are classied
as NTBs and as the intensity of NTBs he argues, is not well di¤erentiated in the
Fund TRI, this tends to underestimate agricultural protection levels. Nor does
the Funds TRI account for subsidies.1 This point is also made in Subramaniam
(2000) in the context of African trade policies.
The Cline paper also has a nice discussion of some recent alternative indices.
The indices covered include the CEPII or MAcMaps (Market Access maps) mea-
sure, the Heritage Foundation-Wall Street Journal index which is a part of their
overall index of economic freedom measure, the OXFAM index of double stan-
dards which focuses on developed country protection against developing countries,
and the CGD (Center for Global Development) Aggregate Measure of Protection
which is meant to do the same thing. Cline points out the well known problems
involved with using trade shares as weights in aggregating tari¤s: namely that
tari¤s reduce trade and so that doing so tend to understate protection. He also
points out that tari¤ equivalents of NTBs are hard to come by and suggests some
rules of thumb for converting various NTBs into tari¤ equivalents. He also recog-
nizes the fact that both the average and the variance of tari¤s matter in terms of
calculating the welfare costs and suggests using a formula that assumes the world
price is given and there is no domestic production.
Cline also discusses the Anderson Neary Trade Restrictiveness Index (AN-
TRI). He argues that their index needs intensive data and modeling inputs and has
less success in incorporating NTBs. His paper summarizes: It seems unlikely that
any of the recent indices reviewed above could (or in some cases should) replace
the IMFs index of trade restrictiveness any time soon.He then summarizes the
objections to each measure. He seems to suggests that a measure he calls the Total
Tari¤ Equivalent (TTE) be used. This involves calculating an average tari¤, a
tari¤ equivalent of NTBs and summing them. The weights to be used at each
stage are not clearly dened and the procedure seems a bit ad-hoc.
This review was widely circulated for comments to experts inside and outside
the fund including Will Martin (World Bank), James Anderson and Peter Neary.
The views of the experts are documented in a series of memos. The comments
by Anderson and Neary, in particular, respond to Clines view that the data re-
quirements for implementing the AN-TRI are excessive. They point out that their
1In general equilibrium, a tari¤ on the imported good (which encourages production and
discourages the consumption) is equivalent to production subsidy and a consumption tax on the
imported good. Thus, a subsidy on production does what a tari¤ would do on the production
side. As a result, the protective e¤ects of subsidies may need to be considered.
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indices can be implemented at less detailed levels and so could have basically the
same data requirements as Clines proposed TTE index. Moreover, that making
the kind of assumptions Cline suggests (for example conversion of NTBs into tar-
i¤s at some xed rate) would reduce the information needs for their indices as
well. The points seem well thought out and fair. However, Clines paper never
came out as an IMF Working Paper.
A June 2003 memo (6/26/2003) from Timothy Geithner to FDMD Anne
Krueger asked for feedback on the Cline paper. In response, Ms. Krueger wrote
that she favored developing an index with other multilateral institutions.
In 2004, in response to complaints from Nigeria that their TRI number was
higher than that of South Africa which, they claimed, had a more restrictive trade
regime (see the 12/17/2004 memo from Hans Peter Lankes to Mark Allen) the
FDMD Anne Krueger asked sta¤ to work on a price wedge based alternative and
propose a remedy within 3 weeks. Meanwhile, the TRI was to be removed from
country sta¤ reports. An inter-departmental working group (RES, PDR, AFTR
and STA) was constituted and provided a report. In the report the group advised
against a price wedge approach as other factors than trade policy a¤ect price gaps
and there was no way to purge the data of these e¤ects. Moreover, the paucity of
internationally comparable price data was cited as making this impractical. (See
also 3/31/2005 memo from Rajan to Krueger.) The working group was clearly
aware of work by World Bank Researchers Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004a,
2004b and 2005) that computes trade restrictiveness indices. The report rst
summarizes the work, noting that it is implemented in three stages. The authors
rst carefully estimate import demand elasticities at a very disaggregated level
(6 digit harmonized system level) for 117 countries using data from 1998-2002..
Then they estimate ad-valorem equivalents of NTBs by estimating the extent to
which the NTBs reduce import values and using these estimates together with
the elasticities in the rst stage to do so. In the third stage they use a partial
equilibrium version of the AN-TRI proposed by Robert Feenstra (called the ANF-
TRI below) to obtain their estimated TRI. Their index is discussed in more detail
below.
The report goes on to say This work represents a clear advance towards
the calculation of trade restrictiveness indices,..and then goes on to outline the
shortcomings of the approach. These include the fact that subsidies (both export
and production) are not incorporated, and that the NTB data used for most of
the countries is out of date. This is a very thoughtful and useful report.
At an Executive Board Meeting on 28 Feb. 2005 (EBM/05/19-1), the Exec-
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utive Board discussed the paper, Review of Fund Work on Trade(SM/05/47),
which included a discussion of Review of the IMFs Trade Restrictiveness Index
(SM/05/57) prepared by the Funds Policy Development and Review Department.
This was an overall discussion of the IMFs approach to trade and also discussed
the usefulness of TRI, given increasing criticism of the Sta¤s over reliance on
TRI for policy advice and in their approach. Sta¤ paper SM/05/57 recommended
that undue emphasis and reliance on TRI be ceased, especially for policy advice
and cross-country comparisons. The Board rea¢ rmed that while not a fully
comprehensive indicator of a countrys trade policy stance, the TRI remains a
useful tool for the Funds work, as it balances reasonably well the requirements
of accuracy, country coverage, timeliness, and methodological soundness. Direc-
tors agreed with the sta¤s recommendation that, in order to avoid a false sense of
precision, including with respect to cross-country comparisons-for which the IMF-
TRI is not suited-the index should henceforth be used mainly as a starting point
in discussions with national authorities, and not be included in individual country
sta¤ reports (EBM/05/19-1). The Directors also agreed to continue to adhere
to the policy of not publicizing the IMF-TRI, keeping it instead only for internal
use and in starting discussions with governments. In addition, the Sta¤ were to
consider ways to improve IMF-TRI as an index and to explore the development
of alternative indices.
Following the 2005 Board Meeting, the IMF-TRI has continued to be compiled
(latest data runs till 2007), but it is unclear under which auspices it is currently
being used and howmuch sta¤rely on this index. For example, it has not shown up
on any 2006 Article IV, selected issues and country report documents that IEOs
trade team has reviewed, showing the adherence to the Boards recommendations.
It is still being computed by PDR. It is not known if IMF-TRI is used by Sta¤
outside the context of these reports.
It is also unclear whether subsequent follow-ups have been enacted following
the Boards recommendation to improve IMF-TRI methodology or explore alter-
native indices. It seems as if this has already been done to some extent: ITCs
Market Access Maps (which measure tari¤s in-depth) have been incorporated to
produce several summary country reports. However, there is no indication of fur-
ther follow-ups with development of the TRI or incorporation of other alternative
indices.
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2. A Good TRI?
Trade restrictiveness (or its opposite, trade openness) sounds like it should be
easy enough to dene and measure. Yet, how it should be dened is far from
uncontroversial. A good index should be conceptually based, implementable and
comparable. That is, it should be objectively dened in terms of what it is
measuring via a model, even if the model is relatively simple. Thus, if what it is
measuring is continuous, it should be continuous as well or it loses information
content.2 It should be relatively easy to calculate using available information. It
should permit comparability over time and space.
The existing literature contains many denitions of trade restrictiveness, and
their meaning and relationships to one another are not clear to the uninitiated.
As shown in Pritchett (1991), the existing measures of trade openness are by
and large uncorrelated. This should come as no surprise for two reasons. First,
none of the denitions he considers are conceptually well based, so that it is not
quite clear what they are measuring. Second, as di¤erent measures are trying to
capture di¤erent aspects of trade restrictiveness, and this is loosely represented by
these measures, there is no reason to expect these di¤erent measures to be highly
correlated. This may well be why di¤erent studies reach di¤erent conclusions
about the relationship between openness and performance of an economy.3
It is also far from clear how to calculate such an index, especially when the time
and resources available are limited as they are in practice. First, assuming the
objective is to measure barriers to trade, how can/should these be measured? Here
there are two broad approaches that can be taken. One can opt for an indirect,
i.e., outcome based approach. (This is analogous to the output approach in R&D
2Attempts to dichotomize the continuum into black and white are counterproductive for two
more reasons. First, it leads to the permeation of ideology into analysis. Outward orientation is
perceived as good and inward orientation as bad on a priori grounds while both (or neither) may
be universally so. Second, it prevents researchers from trying to develop conceptual measures
and permits reliance on ad hoc denitions.
3Some, such as Dollar (1992), and Edwards (1992) (1993), and Frankel and Romer (1999)
conclude that openness or trade is good for growth, while others, like Rodrik and Rodriguez
(2000) cast doubt on this conclusion. In much of this work, trade restrictiveness is measured
by the value of trade relative to national income. There may be good reason to expect a link
between growth and trade value. For example, greater trade may allow greater specialization
and lower costs in industries with dynamic scale e¤ects. If this is the motivation, the value of
trade in these industries should be considered, not the total value of trade. Alternatively, greater
trade may help ll the foreign exchange gap, thereby relieving growth-retarding bottlenecks
as suggested in Krueger (1983) among others.
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where innovation is measured in terms of patents.) This takes the position that
restrictive trade policy should be reected in terms of outcomes like the countrys
trade ows, or in terms of deviations of domestic prices of tradeables from world
prices. Thus, a quota on shoes, for example, should reduce the import value (at
world prices) and raise the domestic price of shoes relative to what it would have
been without the quota. Or one can take a more direct, i.e., an input based
approach. (This is analogous to the input approach in R&D where innovation is
measured in terms of R&D expenditures). This takes the view that trade policy
can be measured directly in terms of what goes into it, namely tari¤s, quotas and
other NTBs. This is clearly easier with tari¤s (though even here the question of
appropriate weights for the tari¤s is an issue) than quotas since quotas need to be
identied and transformed into their ad-valorem equivalents, which is not trivial.
Both approaches have problems associated with them. Estimating trade ow
gaps or price gaps is problematic as trade ows are not well explained by trade
models. The most empirically successful model, the gravity model, is loosely
based on theories that explain trade ows. As a result, taking the view that
deviations from predicted trade ows, must be due to trade policy, is a bold
step.4 Nevertheless, it may be the only viable option in some cases as explained
below. Using price gap measures is also problematic as di¤erences in prices can
occur without trade restrictions being in place. The most obvious issue is that
the quality of imports could di¤er across countries and this could result in NTBs
being mistakenly inferred.
The input based approach has equally vexing problems. For example, as is
well known, in general equilibrium all taxes and subsidies need to be considered.
In particular, one of the results in international trade is that trade policies in
competitive markets are equivalent to a combination of domestic policies as in the
Lerner Symmetry Theorem. Thus, even if one could aggregate in a meaningful way
over tari¤s on di¤erent commodities, trade restrictiveness cannot be dened solely
in terms of trade policy. For example, if a good is imported, a production subsidy
on a good is equivalent to an import tari¤ and a consumption subsidy at the same
rate. Thus, Japans production subsidies on rice can be thought of as an import
tari¤ on rice combined with a consumption subsidy. The treatment of subsidies in
calculating trade barriers could completely change the estimated levels and rankings
4If imports falls short of that predicted in a sector, the extent of the shortfall, together with
the import demand elasticity, yeilds an implicit tari¤ that would result in the observed import
level. Horeover, this is usually a one sided exercise. If a country imports more than predicted
by the regression, the implicit tari¤ is set to be zero.
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of trade restrictiveness across countries. An agricultural developing country might
for this reason take exception to leaving out agricultural subsidies (such as those of
the US, EU and Japan) in such calculations. While this is certainly a valid point,
it is worth pointing out that if we take this stand, then other domestic polices
may also become candidates for inclusion into trade policy measures. Subsidies
have traditionally not been included in most TRIs, though they clearly could be.5
An additional complication arises due to the prevalence of Non Tari¤ barriers,
or NTBs and the recent proliferation of preferential trading areas. Over the many
rounds of negotiations, tari¤ barriers have fallen considerably, but NTBs remain,
often disguised in creative ways and creating measurement issues.6 It is hard to
come up with a tari¤ equivalent of NTBs as detailed knowledge and modelling is
needed to do so. See Deardor¤ (1985) for more on this.
PTAs also complicate measurement of NTBs. Tari¤s between PTA members
are not really zero as restrictive rules of origin may have to be met to obtain
preferential status, see Krishna and Krueger (1995), Krishna (2006). These rules
raise the cost of production and have real costs associated with them. Moreover, as
PTAs raise trade from PTA partners while reducing it from others, so that coming
up with a tari¤ equivalent when PTAs exist is hard to do. Finally, preferences
given to the least developed countries (such as free access for everything but arms
(EBA) in the EU) would reduce the tari¤s levied on trade. However, to the extent
that they are conditional on costly rules of origin being met they both restrict
and distort trade patterns. As a result, outcome based approaches may be the
only option, especially when NTBs, PTAs and preferences are prevalent.
Even assuming we can measure the component parts of trade barriers, how
do we put these together in a meaningful way? How should trade barriers be
weighed? Is only their level relevant or are higher moments important as well?
This is where the need for a model is most striking. A simple or trade weighted
average of (or variance of) trade barriers is relatively easy to construct but it is
far from clear what it means without a model. Suppose, for example, that the
tari¤ is a prohibitive one. A trade weighted average will clearly underestimate
5More on this issue below.
6Cline (2005) for example, points out that if we replace quotas with tari¤ rate quotas, (a
tari¤ rate quota has a penalty tari¤ for imports above the quota level) then the out of quota
penalty tari¤ (converted into ad-valorem terms) should be used as the tari¤ equivalent if there
are imports out of quota. But if there are no such imports then the tari¤ equivalent is harder to
pin down. Martin, in commenting on Clines work, (see his e mail August 6th, 2006 in internal
documentation) also points out that it is important to ensure that specic tari¤s are converted
to ad-valorem ones and not overlooked.
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the extent of protection in this case.
In this context, the strengths and weaknesses of the IMF-TRI are obvious.
Strengths: The IMF-TRI is easily computed because it has low data require-
ments, allowing classication of a wide range of countries frequently. It is also
deceptively simplistic and requires a minimum level of work in its creation.
Weaknesses: The IMF-TRIs simplicity, a strength, has also subjected it to
a range of criticisms. Its most profound criticism is that it is ad-hoc. As it is
not conceptually well based it is not clear what it is measuring. The uninformed
user is lulled into thinking that he/she understands it but only because the
underlying lack of logic is not immediately apparent to those who have not thought
through it rigorously. It has a narrow policy coverage7, does not weight the data
appropriately8, does not accurately reect the policies of countries in RTAs or
PTAs. The TRI is also said to be biased against LDCs, which tend to use more
tari¤barriers rather than the opaque technical or phytosanitary barriers that more
developed countries use.9
Furthermore, the NTB index is insu¢ cient in di¤erentiation of intensity be-
tween ratings (eg. 108 of 183 countries are currently assigned 2NTB rating)
(This is also pointed out in Cline (2003)). This is largely due to the overall reduc-
tion in protection that has occurred over time which has reduced the dispersion
in the index: when originally constructed, an equal share of countries fell in each
category.
The IMFs TRI seems to have served its purpose for general evaluation of pro-
gram countriestrade policies over time, but its limitations of use have become
more of an issue as data availability and technology have improved. It is clear
that it (and this would be true for any measure as no one measure can capture
all the elements of countrys trade policy) must be used in conjunction with qual-
itative analysis and supplemental indicators allowing a more detailed analysis of
a countrys trade policies, and should not be used alone for policy advice. How-
ever, while no index will be perfect and comprehensive, better approaches are now
feasible.
7It does not account for subsides of any form and so cannot capture the implicit protective
e¤ect of agricultural production subsisides.
8Average tari¤s tend to under estimate the extent of protection as explained above and no
attention is paid to the dispersion of tari¤s.
9However, the incorporation of such barriers is not without controversy. Australia, for exam-
ple, has very strict requirements for agricultural imports to prevent pests from entering. This
can translate into very high implict trade policies.
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2.1. Alternatives?
What then, are the alternatives to the IMF-TRI? How do they fare on the three
criteria above? There is little point in making an exhaustive list of measures and
shooting them down. The interested reader can nd comprehensive discussions
of older measures in Edwards (1989), Baldwin (1989), and Deardor¤ and Stern
(1985) and in Krishna (1990). More recently, the commissioned paper by Cline
(2003) contains a discussion of the main recent alternatives being considered and
their operational potential. These include the MAcMaps (Market Access maps)
system,10 the Heritage Foundation-Wall Street Journal index of economic freedom
which has a trade policy component,11 the OXFAM index of double standards that
tries to capture the protection of developed countries against developing ones,12
and the Center for Global Development (CGD) index which tries to calculate
an broader measure of trade policy.13 The only conceptually well based measures
available are the original index proposed by Anderson (1990), Anderson and Neary
(1990, 2003, 2005), and its implementation in a CGE model or the simplied
partial equilibrium analogue proposed by Feenstra (1996), and implemented by
Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).
2.1.1. A Conceptually Well Based Measure
Anderson and Neary develop a distance function based measure of openness that
can be used for both tari¤s and quotas, separately and together and which allows
for di¤erence in rent retention. This is termed the AN-TRI. Rent retention is
an issue both because of the current practice of not selling quotas and because
of evidence in Krishna et al.(1991) that not all the rent goes to exporters even
10The Geneva-Based International Trade Centres (ITC) Market Access Maps is very detailed
on tari¤s but does not include nontari¤ information. PDR has worked with ITC to produce
several summary country reports based on the Market Access Maps system. See Cline (2004).
11This is not conceptually well based and overly simplistic.
12It focuses on one thing: how developed countries protect themselves against competition
from developing ones. It does this in an ad hoc manner by looking at ten factors that it sees as
important. These include the average tari¤s, the tari¤s on textiles and agriculture (which tend
to be important for developing countires), and restrictions on imports from the least developed
countries.
13This is not very well based conceptually being a mix of a trade weighted tari¤ average,
where trade weights are adjusted to account for their dependence on trade policies (recall that
trade restrictions reduce trade and trade weights so this adjustment raises these trade weights),
and a measure of revealed openness (a country is revealed to be less open if it trades less than
predicted). It is also not calculated for a wide range of countries.
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when they get all the licenses. The Anderson-Neary measure is quite analytically
complex, but the basic idea is to calculate how much all tari¤s have to be in-
creased and quotas decreased to keep utility at the original level. This equation is
then totally di¤erentiated to get new and interesting results for piecemeal policy
reform. The relevant comparative statics terms turn out to be quite easy to sign
and calculate if further technical assumptions on the trade balance function are
made14.
Note rst that as their index is derived by taking derivatives, it is reliable only
for asessing small changes in trade policies.
Second, and much more severe, inter-temporal and cross country comparison
are hard to make using their index. A given percentage change in their index does
not correspond to the same percentage change in welfare across time or space
when the economies are di¤erent. As same nation has di¤erent economies over
time and di¤erent nations have di¤erent economies, their index number has some
serious comparability problems. Of course, this is much less of a problem for a
given economy than across economies as a given economy is likely to change only
slowly over time. Anderson (1990) argues that using average tari¤s or even trade
weighted ones gives very di¤erent rankings over time from their index and so be
misleading.
3. A Simpler Version: The ANF-TRI
The partial equilibrium version of the AN-TRI index, suggested by Feenstra (1996)
and implemented by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004), which we will call the ANF-
TRI, is easier to calculate, more transparent, and comparable than their original
index and requires less information. It calculates the uniform tari¤, that if applied
to imports, would leave the welfare of the importing country una¤ected, assuming
that world prices are xed. It seem like this could be a possible successor to the
IMF-TRI.
3.1. The ANF-TRI
The ANF-TRI takes as a rst step the welfare loss for a small country in partial
equilibrium of a given set of tari¤s. This consists of the di¤erence in welfare (which
is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and net tari¤ revenue) at the
given tari¤s relative to that at free trade. Consider Figure 1 where supply and
14Tokarick (2007) looks at the sensitivity of the the AN-TRI to alternative model structures.
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demand are linear. The world price is P : At this price the good is imported as
domestic demand, Dd, exceeds domestic supply, Sd as depicted in Figure 1. M(:)
denotes imports and equals domestic demand less domestic supply. A specic tari¤
of t (or an ad-valorem one of T where P T = t; raises the domestic price to P + t.
Imports fall from CH to DF: Also producer surplus rises by area ABCD and net
government revenue rises by area DEFG, while consumer surplus is reduced by
the area ABFH. The net e¤ect is a loss of areaDCE and FGH, the two triangles
of dead weight loss in Figure 1.15
Now consider these two triangles. For FGH, the base is just the absolute value
of slope of demand times t; while the height is t: Similarly for DCE; the base is
just the absolute value of slope of supply times t; while the height is t: Thus the
area of the two triangles is just
DCE + FGH =  1
2
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where  is the import demand elasticity dened as a positive number.
Now doing this across sectors gives the welfare loss of the tari¤s to be
1
2
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M i(P i)P i
 
T i
2
(3.1)
where T i is the ad valorem tari¤ in sector i. Now suppose there was a uniform
tari¤ T . Then, by the same reasoning, the welfare loss from that uniform tari¤
15Note also that the tari¤ is equivalent to a production subsidy and a consumption tax at
the same rate. A production subsidy of t would raise the price facing producers to P  + t but
leave the price facing consumers una¤ected. The result would be that producer surplus rises by
ABDC, while government revenue falls by ABDE with a net loss of CDE. A consumption tax
would raise the price facing consumers to P + t but leave the price facing producers una¤ected.
It would reduce consumer surplus by ABFH and raise government revenue by AGFB with a net
loss of FGH. Note that together, the production subsidy and consumption tax have the same
e¤ect as a tari¤! Simailarly, a production subsidy is equivalent to a tari¤ and a consumption
subsidy at the same rate.
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Figure 3.1: Tari¤s in a Small Country
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would be
1
2
NX
i=1
 
i

M i(P i)P iT 2 (3.2)
Setting (3.1) equal to (3.2) gives:
T =
"
NX
i=1
 
(i)M i(P i)P iPN
i=1 (
i)M i(P i)P i
! 
T i
2#1=2
=
"
NX
i=1
 
si
  
T i
2#1=2
where si = (
i)M i(P i)P iPN
i=1(
i)M i(P i)P i
is the elasticity adjusted import value share of sector
i: By denition, T; is the ANF-TRI and as shown, equals the square root of the
weighted sum of the square of ad valorem tari¤s. Note that both higher tari¤s
and more variance result in a higher index. It is easy to see, that for a given mean
tari¤, T is minimized when siT i is constant for all i: In other words, in this setting,
greater generalized variance, given the mean, reduces welfare as does increasing
all tari¤s proportionally. This makes intuitive sense as free trade is rst best here
so welfare is maximized at zero tari¤s. Small tari¤s hence do not change welfare
much, while large ones do, making greater dispersion alone bad for welfare.
3.2. Calculating the Index
To calculate the index, rst all Non Tari¤Barriers (NTBs) need to be transformed
into Ad Valorem Tari¤ Equivalents (AVEs). This is done by assuming that all
di¤erences (not due to existing tari¤s) between domestic and international prices
are due to some unaccounted for trade policies which we can lump together and call
non tari¤ barriers. This is quite a heroic assumption to make given the existence
of substantial unexplained price di¤erentials in freely traded goods. Once these
unexplained price di¤erences are inferred, the tari¤s that would have induced
them, given estimated values of import demand elasticities can be backed out.
These elasticities are estimates across countries and products (at the 6-digit level
of the Harmonized System of product classication).16
16For details on how these elasticities were estimated, see Kee et. al. (2004).
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Second, when tari¤s are specic, namely set to be t dollars per unit, they need
to be converted to their AVEs. (It is important to be careful about this as ad-
valorem and specic tari¤s are often reported separately, especially in agriculture,
and can easily be missed. Will Martin, in his memo to Mary Jo Marquez, August
6, 2003, commenting on the paper by Cline, suggests that this is a good part of the
reason for unrealistically low estimates for Japans agricultural protection.) Then
a weighted sum of these (the weights are the elasticity adjusted import value shares
denoted by si above) is taken at the tari¤ line level. Note that the weights are
increasing in the import shares and elasticities of import demand. These weights
properly account for the importance that restrictions on these good would have
on the overall restrictiveness.
Thus, information on tari¤ levels, AVEs of NTMs, import share data as well
as elasticities of import demand are needed for implementation. It is important to
use the weights si on the ad valorem tari¤s, rather than just take a simple average.
Anderson and Neary (1998) show that trade weighted average tari¤s are close to
uncorrelated with and are about 50% lower than their index in their data17.
3.3. Related Indices
A similar index, the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI), is calcu-
lated by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004). It computes the equivalent uniform
tari¤ of country M that would keep imports of country M at their observed levels.
This is (somewhat confusingly) referred to as the OTRI by Kee et al (2004) and
in World Bank publications and so as not to muddy the waters further, I will
use their nomenclature. Finally, the MA-OTRI looks at the uniform tari¤ that if
imposed by all of country Ms trading partners would keep its exports constant.
These are discussed in more detail below.
3.3.1. The OTRI
The approach here follows the same lines. Consider the reduction in imports from
the specic tari¤ t: Imports fall from CH to D or by the sum of the bases of the
two dead weight loss triangles. For FGH, the base is just the absolute value of
slope of demand times t: Similarly for DCE; the base is just the absolute value
17If data are not available, simplifying assumptions can be made.
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of slope of supply times t: Thus the fall in the value of imports due to t is
M =  
 
t
d
 
Dd(P )  Sd(P )
dP
!
P 
=  

dM(P )
dP
P 
M(P )

M(P )
P 

(TP )
= ()M(P )P T
Thus, summing over sectors gives the import decrease due to the existing set of
tari¤s to be
NX
i=1
 
i

M i(P i)P iT i: (3.3)
The import decline from a uniform tari¤ T would then be
T
NX
i=1
 
i

M i(P i)P i: (3.4)
Hence, the uniform tari¤ that would result in the same decrease in import value,
denoted by T o; is obtained by setting these two equal and is
T o =
"
NX
i=1

(i)M i(P i)P iP
(i)M i(P i)P i

T i
#
=
NX
i=1
siT i:
This is just the elasticity adjusted import share weighted average tari¤. Note that
the OTRI thus does not depend on the variance of tari¤s. This makes sense as it
is targeting imports, which vary at a constant rate with tari¤s, not welfare.
3.3.2. The MA-OTRI
This looks at the fall in a countys exports due to the tari¤s imposed by its trading
partners. Consider a single good i exported by a country k that has the specic
tari¤ tijk imposed on it by a trading partner j. The approach here follows the
same lines as that above. Consider the reduction in the value of k0s exports of i
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from the specic tari¤ tijk: The fall in the value of imports from country k due to
tijk is
=  

tijk
d (M ij(P i))
dP

P i
=  

dM ij(P i)
dP i
P i
M ij(P i)

M ij(P i)
P i
 
T ijkP i

=
 
ij

M ij(P i)P iT i
Thus, summing over countries and sectors gives the import decrease due to the
existing set of tari¤s to be
NX
i=1
KX
j 6=k
 
ij

M ij(P i)P iT ijk: (3.5)
The import decline from a uniform tari¤ Tm would then be
Tm
NX
i=1
KX
j 6=k
 
ij

M ij(P i)P i: (3.6)
Hence, the uniform tari¤ that would result in the same decrease in import value
is obtained by setting these two equal and is
Tm =
"
NX
i=1
KX
j 6=k
  
ijk

M ij(P i)P iPN
i=1
PK
j 6=k (
ijk)M ij(P i)P i
T ijk
!#
=
NX
i=1
KX
j 6=k
sijkT ijk:
This is just the elasticity adjusted export share weighted average tari¤. Note that
the OTRI thus does not depend on the variance of tari¤s. This makes sense as it
is targeting imports, which vary at a constant rate with tari¤s.
3.4. Implementation
The website at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/wti2008/1a.asp has the world
trade indicators. These websites maintained by the World Bank18 have the coun-
try level estimates for the OTRI and MA-OTRI calculated by the Bank and which
18In the World Trade Indicators website see for TRIs:
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are the basis for the aggregate numbers reported in the Global Monitoring Re-
port (GMR). They are also shown separately for agriculture and manufacturing,
and both with and without NTBs (which are the weakest part of the procedure)
included. The ANF-TRI index, as well as the OTRI and MA-OTRI are reported
in Kee et al (2004) for 91 countries. many, mostly smaller countries do not have
TRIs calculated for them, presumably as their data was poor. Obtaining better
data and more comprehensive coverage is an area where cooperation between the
Bank, Fund, WTO and other bodies would be very useful.
The index is model based and comparable across time and space. In addition,
while not as simple as the IMF-TRI, it is reasonable simple to calculate and there
is a commitment by the Bank to update it annually.
3.5. Deciencies
As with all measures, the ANF-TRI, as well as the related indices discussed above,
have some clear deciencies. First, it is worth pointing out that these indices are
all targeted at di¤erent things. Thus, the ANF-TRI for example, as dened above,
does not account for subsidies. To the extent that subsidies encourage production
(as does a tari¤ on the good) and that this information is what is needed, this
is a drawback. However, if one wanted to develop an index that measured the
extent to which domestic production was being distorted by trade and domestic
policies like subsidies, the appropriate index of domestic subsidizationcould be
dened and estimated using the approach above. This seems like the appropriate
way to deal with subsidies if the concern is production. If the concern is imports,
one could include subsidies and tari¤s at given levels and ask what uniform tari¤
combined with zero subsidies, would lead to the existing level of imports. As
should be evident, there are a large number of such variations possible and there
is no one size ts all index possible.
Second, the NTB equivalent estimation (which is a component of the above
measures) is not very reliable as price di¤erences in a country need not be due to
protection. In addition, this data tends to not to be updated annually. This makes
the index as a whole less useful for Fund operational work. For this reason, it is
important that the indices be reported both with and without NTBs as is done
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0contentMDK:21085342~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
and for country briefs see
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0contentMDK:21393040~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:239071,00.html
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by the Bank. Of course, ideally one would like to handle NTBs di¤erently. With
detailed information on which sectors had NTBs and what they were, one could
model their e¤ect and estimate the advalorem equivalents sector by sector and
case by case. However, this is at present not likely to be practical. Nevertheless,
better information on NTBs will help construct some simple cross checks. For
example, it would be worth checking if sectors where we suspect NTBs exist and
are restrictive tend to have high imputed ad-valorem tari¤s..
Third, the index could be criticized on the basis that it assumes perfect com-
petition. This is much less of a concern for two reasons. First, the best should not
stand in the way of the good. The proposed index is so much better than what the
IMF has at present that this dictum is very apt here. Second, why would one want
to add imperfect competition? In welfare based measures like the ANF-TRI one
would want to do so as the welfare loss from tari¤s in already distorted settings
could be much higher than in undistorted ones. For example, limited competition
in the domestic market could allow import quotas to facilitate collusion and result
in large welfare losses. This would be the case for adding imperfect competition.
However, there is only one way to have perfect competition and an innite number
of ways to have imperfect competition. Which way should it be added? No clean
answer exists here. Thus, while market imperfections should be noted, adding
this complication to an index would not be advisable.
Fourth, the proliferation of PTAs and a complex of overlapping preferences and
Rules of Origin needed to obtain them have made things even more complicated
in the real world. Here there is not much that can be done in terms of creating an
index that incorporates this feature of the real world. One could, of course, infer
tari¤s in the same manner as the tari¤ equivalents of NTBs are inferred, which
would in a way account for all of this, but given the di¢ culties associated with
this method discussed above, this would be ill advised.
Finally, these indices are essentially partial equilibrium constructs. They ig-
nore any general equilibrium interactions, both between nal goods and between
nal and intermediates as captured by measures like the e¤ective rate of protec-
tion.
Are the limitations of the above, or in fact any index of trade restrictiveness,
going to be important enough to mean that using it without substantial other
analysis of trade policies (bear in mind that Fund sta¤ expertise and resources
for the analysis of trade policy are limited) is going to create more problems than
it is worth in terms of accurately portraying the relative restrictiveness or change
over time of a countrys trade policy? The answer to this is no. While there will
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always be criticisms, using these kinds of indices will in fact insulate the Fund from
criticism for two reasons. First, the indices, and the approach they are based on,
are vetted, at least implicitly by other multilateral organizations as they are part
of the GMR. Second, critics would have to make the case that the index leaves
out something important, what this is, and how it should be included. This would
at least allow a common language for dialogue and would be preferable to loose
arguments that the number given to a country is too high.
As long as the limitations of these indices are kept in mind, they represent a
useful advance over the status quo.
4. Conclusion and Recommendations
The recommendations below are also based on numerous interviews with Fund
sta¤ including some of who have left the Fund (Anne Krueger, Hans Peter Lankes,
Shang Jin Wei, Arvind Subramaniam) as well as those who remain at the Fund. A
unifying concern in these interviews was that the Fund is not well placed (given its
macro focus) in terms of trade expertise, and in terms of institutional constraints,
to developing and keeping up a TRI that approaches the best available practice
in the area. While the former Trade Policy Department (TPD) was well placed to
do certain aspects of the IMFs work on trade maybe not research work, but the
practical work of keeping track of policy changes and coordinating the IMFs role
in the global institutional dialogue that is one important component of keeping the
IMF current on trade policy issues, it was not well placed to creating and keeping
up a TRI that incorporated the best available practice in the area. The current
IMF-TRI was developed and is maintained in PDR (now SPR). This is not the
ideal arrangement and that responsibility for deciding and keeping under review
how the IMF monitors trade policy (whether it is by using the Banks measures
or developing its own) should be moved to RES. Since the departure of Anne
Krueger, the Trade Division in Research has been phased out. The other group
in the Fund, the Trade Policy Division/PDR (now SPR), is more operationally
oriented and not well suited to do this work either.
In light of all of this, it makes even more sense for the Fund to use an exist-
ing vetted index. Even if the concept it needs to implement di¤ers from that of
any existing index, much can be incorporated using extensions of the approach
described above to develop and implement an index directed to these needs.
The fund thus has two options. The rst option is to improve the existing
index. The existing index could be signicantly improved by doing two things.
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First, the ranges of the index need to be redened as most countries today fall
in the lower part of the index. Second, the NTB coverage could be improved
signicantly using existing work by Kee et al. Such improvements would however
not address the central problem with the index which is that it is not conceptually
well based. Use of such an index would leave the Fund open to the kinds of
criticisms that initially made Ms. Krueger ask for reform of the index. For this
reason, this route is not advisable.
Second, it could go with an existing index. Here, given its advantages, the
resources the Bank has devoted to the ANF-TRI and its commitment to update
it annually, the obvious suspect is the ANF-TRI. The data requirements are very
similar for all three indices outlined above. If additional dimensions are deemed
advisable, the Fund could use information on other indices like the cost of doing
business indicators developed by the World Bank. The relevant indices are avail-
able online. The averages of some of these indices are being reported in the Global
Monitoring Report (GMR) which is put out under the joint auspices of the Bank,
Fund, WTO and UNCTAD, and has presumably been vetted by all of the above.
This provides additional legitimacy for the Funds use of the index. Moreover, the
Bank is said to be committed to updating these indices annually for the GMR.
In this context, one suspects that while the Fund might be reasonably sat-
ised with a measure of protection based on the size of the welfare/utility loss
that results from tari¤s, quotas, and subsidies under perfect competition, many
of the IMFs stakeholders, especially the newly developing countries, may not. In
these circles, the concern is that developed country subsidies (certainly those to
agriculture) raise domestic production and reduce imports. They are naturally
quite likely to be suspicious of a measure based solely on the welfare loss to the
protecting country. In the interests of being even handed and incorporating these
concerns, it would be well worth extending the index to include subsidies as dis-
cussed above. This could also be of use in trade negotiations and other discussion
of trade policy on the impact of trade protection on producerscompetitiveness.
One might ask whether the IMF should be doing this alone, or with other multi-
lateral institutions. Here, one suspects that the latter would be preferable in order
to have the implicit approval of as many of these multilateral bodies as possible.
Greater cooperation with the Bank, the WTO and UNCTAD should allow the
needed indices to be generated annually for use by the IMF and other agencies.
Such cooperation would also help improve the poor quality of data on NTBs,
which researchers blame for poor measurement of NTBs. A working group which
involves these agencies and leading researchers (including Alan Deardor¤ and
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Anne Krueger) has been directed with coming up with ways to better measure
NTBs and is at present working on these issues. This push is unlikely to produce
much that is of use in the near future.
To conclude, one might also ask whether, given the generalized reduction in
tari¤s, a TRI is vital to the Funds work? Similarly, should trade protectionism
kick up in the next few years, would having a good TRI be a substantial (though
obviously not fail-safe) tool for allowing the IMF to play a role in identifying and
combating it? The answer to both these is a denite yes. Though tari¤s have
fallen, more creative ways are continually being found to limit trade.19 Thus, a
TRI that has a hope of identifying such creative barriers (as the NTB part of the
above indices does) is potentially very valuable both in measuring the level and
the changes (should such protectionism occur) in protection. All multilateral in-
stitutions should be continually working on research that will help to improve the
detection and measurement of such hidden restrictions. Clearly the Fund cannot
do this alone, but nor can any other body. This has to be done multilaterally.
However, interviews with Anne Krueger and others made clear the fact that the
costs of coordination across institutions are large and should not be underesti-
mated.
19Note the Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and Orderly Marketing Arrangements
(OMAs) in the 80s which substituted for quotas which are technically illegal. More recently,
the possibility of using complex phyto sanitary requirements (to shut out less sophisticated ex-
porters from developing countries who may have a hard time meeting them) to limit imports
has been a subject of discussion.
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